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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
     We are called upon to determine the scope of the fiduciary 
duty owed by a broker-dealer of securities under the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended ("ERISA"), 29 
U.S.C. §1104(a) in the rather narrow circumstances presented by 
this appeal.  Various employee benefit funds sued Janney 
Montgomery Scott, Inc. ("Janney") alleging that Janney's failure 
to disclose information about one of Janney's employees was a 
breach of Janney's fiduciary duty under Section 404(a) of ERISA, 
and under federal and state common law.  The district court 
assumed for purposes of summary judgment that Janney was a 
"functional" or "limited purpose" fiduciary pursuant to Section 
3(21)(A)(ii) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii), but held that 
any liability that Janney had in such capacity extended only to 
its investment advice.  Since Janney's alleged breach had nothing 
to do with investment advice, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Janney and against the Funds on each count 
of the complaint.  See Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local 252 
Annuity Fund, et al. v. Newbridge Securities, Inc., et al., 877 
F.Supp. 948, 953-954 (E.D.Pa. 1995).    
     For the reasons that follow we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment on the federal common law claim, but reverse the 
grant of summary judgment on the ERISA claim, and the state 
common law claim.   
 
                      I. Factual Background 
     The plaintiffs are numerous funds maintained by Local 252 of 
the Glaziers and Glassworkers Union (the Annuity Fund, Pension 
Fund, Health and Welfare Fund, Vacation Fund, and Apprentice 
Fund), and two individual fiduciaries of those funds - Sean 
McGarvey and Martin Rosenberg (collectively, the "Funds").  Each 
of the funds are related Employee Benefit Plans managed by a 
board of trustees.  Historically, the Funds limited the majority 
of their investments to federally-insured certificates of deposit 
issued by Philadelphia area banks that the Funds' trustees were 
familiar with.  
     The seeds of the instant suit were sown in 1982 when  
Richard Socket, the Funds' Administrator, met a Janney employee 
named Michael Lloyd.  Socket introduced Lloyd to the Funds' 
trustees and recommended that the trustees consider and accept 
Lloyd's advice on new investments.  Socket was particularly 
interested in CDs issued by non-Philadelphia area banks with 
which Lloyd was familiar and which offered rates of interest 
superior to those offered by Philadelphia area banks.   
     At some point between 1982 and June 1985, Lloyd became a 
Vice President at Janney.  He also became increasingly involved 
with the Funds and their investments.  During that period, the 
Funds, on Lloyd's advice, purchased a total of 73 CDs and other 
investments through Janney.  The total value of these investments 
was in excess of $3,000,000.  
     The Funds contend that as time went on Lloyd routinely 
attended meetings of the Funds' trustees, offered advice 
concerning overall investment strategy, and came to be referred 
to as the Funds' "investment consultant."  The Funds also allege 
that Lloyd would routinely call Socket and recommend a particular 
investment as being particularly well-suited to the Funds' 
specific investment strategy.  According to Socket, it was rare 
that the Funds did not accept that advice. 
     At a meeting held on June 12, 1984 the trustees passed a 
motion appointing Lloyd "the financial consultant to all funds." 
See Brief of Appellee at 6.  His relationship with the Funds can 
be gleaned in part from the minutes of the trustees' meeting of 
August 28, 1984, which read: "an investment decision may be made 
by the [Funds'] administrator with the approval of one trustee 
from each side [Employer and Union], to carry out recommendations 
of investment consultant, Michael Lloyd."  This relationship 
continued for sometime to the apparent satisfaction of all 
concerned. 
     However, the plot began to thicken in early June of 1985 
when Janney began investigating Lloyd because of suspected 
improprieties in Lloyd's personal investments.  Lloyd had failed 
to make a payment to a partnership in which he was a limited 
partner, and Janney had come to suspect that he had tried to 
cover-up the late payment by tendering a cashier's check that had 
been fraudulently altered to create the appearance that it had 
been timely presented.  Lloyd failed to explain what had actually 
occurred, but he did deny any wrongdoing.  Despite Lloyd's 
denial, Janney conducted an internal investigation.  Pending the 
completion of the investigation, and prior to a scheduled meeting 
with Lloyd's attorney, Janney informed Lloyd that he was 
suspended.  Thereafter, on June 17, 1985, Janney informed Lloyd's 
attorney of its intent to discharge Lloyd.  The following 
morning, June 18, 1985, Lloyd resigned from Janney.   
     Each of the parties to this dispute put their own "spin" on 
the circumstances leading to Lloyd's resignation.  The Funds 
argue that Lloyd continued to obfuscate and prevaricate 
throughout Janney's investigation thereby causing Janney to 
discharge him.  Janney, however, argues that Lloyd was forced to 
resign because he was unable to conform to the very high standard 
of conduct demanded of Janney employees. 
     In any event, when Lloyd left, Janney reported his departure 
to the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") as 
required by the rules of that association.  Janney completed the 
required "Uniform Termination Notice for Securities Industry 
Registration" form, and sent it to the NASD.  Question No. 14 on 
that form asks: 
          Is there reason to believe that the 
          individual while employed or associated with 
          your firm, may have violated any provision of 
          any securities law or regulation or any 
          agreement with or rule of any governmental 
          agency or self-regulatory body, or engaged in 
          any conduct which may be inconsistent with 
          just and equitable principles of trade? 
 
(Joint Appendix at 151a).  Janney answered "Yes," and included a 
detailed narrative explaining that answer.  In relevant part, 
Janney's explanation included the following:  
             In November 1983, Mr. Lloyd purchased one 
          unit of Austin Investors, L.P., a real estate 
          limited partnership, at a cost of $39,500.  
          The terms of the partnership agreement called 
          for annual contributions to be remitted 
          directly to Ascott Investment Corp.  During 
          the month of February 1985 our Financial 
          Services Department became aware that the 
          payment due February 1, 1985 had not been 
          received by the Partnership.  It is standard 
          procedure to be notified by them in the event 
          of apparent late payment by any of Janney's 
          customers.  Enclosed are a series of letters 
          from Ascott to Mr. Lloyd with respect to the 
          past due payments. 
 
             Upon learning of this, personnel of that 
          department asked Mr. Lloyd for an 
          explanation.  He reported to them that timely 
          payment had in fact been remitted by him.  In 
          an effort to resolve any question, Mr. Lloyd 
          was asked to furnish some evidence of that 
          payment.  In late May, he presented to Firm 
          personnel a copy of the face of a Cashier's 
          Check in the amount of $9,980. . . .This 
          showed a date of "2-21-85" and the payee as 
          Ascott Investment Corp.  In consideration of 
          this, our Firm contacted Ascott, advised them 
          of the check copy, and asked that they review 
          their records.  It was subsequently reported 
          by them that they were unable to find any 
          record of this check.  Mr. Lloyd was asked to 
          obtain a copy of the reverse side of that 
          check which should have shown an endorsement 
          and thus establish whether Ascott had in fact 
          cashed the check.  It was also suggested that 
          he issue a stop payment on the February 
          check. On June 6, 1985 Mr. Lloyd did purchase 
          a Cashier's Check for $9,980 which was 
          delivered to Austin to cover the payment due 
          for February. 
 
             Our firm then made inquiries at Fidelity 
          Bank, where the check had been drawn. . .    
          After a search of their records, they 
          notified us that they could find no evidence 
          of a check dated February 21, 1985.  However, 
          based on their further review they identified 
          that February check as one which was actually 
          drawn May 21, 1985. 
 
             In light of these disclosures it appeared 
          that the May 21, 1985 check and the February 
          21, 1985 check were one and the same.  
          Moreover, there was an inference that the May 
          21 date may have been altered to represent a 
          "2-21-85" date on the copy presented as proof 
          of payment. 
 
(Joint Appendix at 152a-153a).  
 
     Janney did not inform the Funds of the circumstances 
surrounding Lloyd's departure.  Instead, Janney assigned a new 
account executive, Mitchell B. Pinheiro, to Lloyd's accounts, 
including the Funds' accounts.  On June 20, 1985, Pinheiro wrote 
a letter of introduction to Socket in which Pinheiro informed the 
Funds only that Lloyd had resigned as a Janney representative.  
     The NASD conducted its own investigation of Lloyd.  That 
investigation resulted only in the NASD issuing a letter of 
caution to Lloyd in which it reminded him that he was obliged to 
ensure that his own personal securities transactions were paid in 
a timely fashion.   
     Meanwhile, Lloyd had established Lloyd Securities, Inc. 
("LSI"), upon leaving Janney.  Six days after Lloyd left Janney, 
the Funds decided to follow him and to transfer their accounts to 
Lloyd's new firm.  Once Lloyd obtained the necessary regulatory 
approvals he asked the Funds to transfer their accounts from 
Janney to LSI.  On June 24, 1985, the Funds' trustees voted to 
transfer the Funds' accounts from Janney to Lloyd and his new 
firm.  However, the transfer was not made until sometime in 
September of 1985 when Janney transferred the Funds' accounts to 
Provident National Bank (as custodian) pending final transfer to 
Lloyd and LSI, in accordance with instructions from Socket.  
Janney does not suggest that it did not know that the accounts 
were to be transferred to LSI and Lloyd when it transferred the 
accounts to Provident pursuant to Socket's instructions.  Janney 
never told the Funds of the circumstances surrounding Lloyd's 
departure from Janney.   
     After the Funds transferred their accounts to LSI, the Funds 
expanded the type and scope of investments which they permitted 
Lloyd to make on their behalf.  The relationship with Lloyd 
continued until March, 1990, when the Funds learned that Lloyd 
and LSI were under investigation by the SEC and, concerned over 
the handling of their investments, finally terminated their 
relationship with Lloyd.  However, by that time, Lloyd had stolen 
Fund assets in excess of $500,000 and had wasted additional 
assets in excess of $2,000,000 in what the Funds refer to as 
"bizarre and worthless investments."   
     Eventually, Lloyd pled guilty to numerous criminal offenses 
based upon his fraudulent conduct. In his guilty plea, he 
admitted stealing money from customers, including the Funds, and 
covering the thefts with forged and bogus documents.  He was 
sentenced to a prison term and the SEC and other regulatory 
authorities shut down LSI and its related companies.  
     The Funds contend that Janney did not offer the information 
about the circumstances of Lloyd's departure out of fear of being 
sued by Lloyd.  Janney denies this and explains that it did not 
inform the Funds of the circumstances of Lloyd's departure 
because it had only unproven suspicions that Lloyd never 
admitted.  Janney thus argues that it "acted prudently in not 
volunteering to customers unproven allegations and innuendo, 
which might well have been false."  Brief of Janney at 8. 
                     II. Procedural History. 
     The Funds filed a three count complaint against Janney 
alleging breach of fiduciary obligations under Section 404(a) of 
ERISA (Count I), and breach of fiduciary duties under both 
federal and state common law (Counts II and III respectively).  
The Funds claimed that Janney was a fiduciary under ERISA and 
that Janney breached its fiduciary duty by failing to disclose 
the circumstances surrounding Lloyd's departure.  The Funds 
asserted that had they known about Lloyd's conduct, they would 
not have transferred their accounts to Lloyd and LSI, and 
incurred the losses that purportedly resulted.  After the 
pleadings were closed and discovery completed, the Funds and 
Janney filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district 
court granted summary judgment for Janney. In rejecting the 
Funds' theory, the district court stated: 
             We do not today address the issue of 
          whether Janney is an ERISA fiduciary because 
          of our conclusion that the circumstances 
          complained of fall outside the scope of any 
          fiduciary relationship that may have existed 
          between Janney and the Funds.  Thus, any 
          fiduciary obligation did not encompass a duty 
          to inform the Funds of the circumstances 
          regarding Mr. Lloyd. 
 
Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local 252 Annuity Fund, et al. v. 
Newbridge Securities, Inc., et al, 877 F.Supp. 948, 951 (E.D.Pa. 
1995).  The court reasoned that any exposure Janney may have had 
because of Lloyd's investment advice to the Funds, was limited to 
"the substance of the advice provided."  Id. at 953.   
     The district court granted summary judgment to Janney on 
Count II (the federal common law claim) because it concluded that 
the regulatory scheme of ERISA left no room for the application 
of federal common law.  Id. at 954.  Finally, since any claim the 
Funds may have had under state common law was pre-empted by 
ERISA, the district court granted Janney's motion for summary 
judgment on Count III as well. Id.  
                                  
                         III. Discussion 
                      A. Standard of Review. 
 
     Summary judgment is proper only where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact for the fact-finder to decide. 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).  In order to demonstrate the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact, it is the burden of the nonmovant 
to supply sufficient evidence, not mere allegations, in support 
of its position for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant.  
Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 
10 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 1993).  Our standard of review on an 
appeal from a grant of summary judgment is plenary. Id. at 146.   
We apply the same test the district court should have used 
initially, Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell 
Dufftyn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 76 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1109 (1991), and review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was 
entered.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life 
Ins. Co., 10 F.3d at 146. 
                 B. Janney's Failure to Disclose. As noted above, the 
district court assumed that the Funds 
could establish that Janney was a fiduciary but held that since 
it was undisputed that any loss did not result from Janney's 
investment advice, the Funds could not recover.  The Court 
reasoned: 
                    Since it undisputed that Janney was never a 
                    named fiduciary, its liability must be 
                    limited to the function it performed; . . . 
                    The Funds' claims are based not on the 
                    substance of the advice it received from 
                    Janney, but on their contention that subsumed 
                    under the rubric of 'investment advice' is 
                    the right to be informed as to the nature of 
                    the individual providing that advice. 
                           *   *   * 
                         . . . we must conclude that events 
                    complained of fall outside the scope of the 
                    fiduciary duty Janney may have owed to the 
                    Funds, and that Janney was under no duty to 
                    relate to the Funds the information 
                    concerning Mr. Lloyd.  
                     
          877 F.Supp. at 953. 
     Accordingly, we begin with a discussion of the scope of any 
fiduciary obligation that may have been owed to the Funds.  
However, because the scope of duty owed is, to some extent, 
dependent upon the type of fiduciary status one has, we must 
briefly discuss how Janney may have become a fiduciary. In doing 
so, however, we do not intend to suggest that Janney was or was 
not a fiduciary, or that any loss the Funds sustained was caused 
by anything Janney did or failed to do.  The district court made 
no finding on those issues because no finding was necessary given 
its reasoning.  On remand, the district court will be able to 
properly develop a record and determine if Janney's relationship 
to the Funds was that of fiduciary, and to what extent the Funds 
can establish causation.   
     There are three ways to acquire fiduciary status under 
ERISA: (1) being named as the fiduciary in the instrument 
establishing the employee benefit plan, 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(2); 
(2) being named as a fiduciary pursuant to a procedure specified 
in the plan instrument, e.g., being appointed an investment 
manager who has fiduciary duties toward the plan, 29 U.S.C. § 
1102(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38); and (3) being a fiduciary under 
the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), which provides that a 
person is a fiduciary 
          with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he 
          exercises any discretionary authority or 
          discretionary control respecting management 
          of such plan or exercises any authority or 
          control respecting management or disposition 
          of assets, (ii) he renders investment advice 
          for a fee or other compensation, direct or 
          indirect, with respect to any moneys or other 
          property of such plan, or has any authority 
          or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has 
          any discretionary authority or discretionary 
          responsibility in the administration of such 
          plan. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
     The district court correctly referred to regulations of the 
Department of Labor that clarify "rendering investment advice" 
under ERISA.  The regulation provides: 
 
             A person shall be deemed to be rendering 
          "investment advice" to an employee benefit 
          plan, within the meaning of section 
          3(21)(A)(ii) of [ERISA][i.e., 29 U.S.C. 
          1002(21)(A)(ii)] and this paragraph, only if: 
 
          (I) Such person renders advice to the plan as 
          to the value of securities or other property, 
          or makes recommendation as to the 
          advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
          selling securities or other property; and 
 
          (ii) Such person either directly or 
          indirectly (e.g., through or together with 
          any affiliate)- 
 
          (A)  Has discretionary authority or control, 
          whether or not pursuant to agreement, 
          arrangement or understanding, with respect to 
          purchasing or selling securities or other 
          property for the plan; or 
 
          (B)  Renders any advice described in 
          paragraph (c)(1)(I) of this section on a 
          regular basis to the plan pursuant to a 
          mutual agreement, arrangement or 
          understanding, written or otherwise, between 
          such person and the plan or a fiduciary with 
          respect to the plan, that such services will 
          serve as a primary basis for investment 
          decisions with respect to plan assets, and 
          that such person will render individualized 
          investment advice to the plan based on the 
          particular needs of the plan regarding such 
          matters as, among other things, investment 
          policies or strategy, overall portfolio 
          composition, or diversification of plan 
          investments. 
 
29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c)(1).   
     Here, both the Funds and Janney agree that Janney could only 
have become a fiduciary under the provisions of 29 U.S.C. 
1002(21)(A)(ii), i.e., that Janney "render[ed] investment advice 
for . . . compensation" or had "authority or responsibility to do 
so." The Funds admit that Janney had no discretionary authority 
with respect to "purchasing or selling securities or other 
property" for the Funds and, accordingly, alternative "(A)" does 
not apply.  Therefore, if Janney was an ERISA fiduciary because 
it rendered investment advise for a fee, it acquired this status 
under alternative "(B)".   
                  C. The Scope of Janney's Duty. 
     The district court relied in part upon a Department of Labor 
regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (FR-16), to hold that Janney's 
liability as a non-named fiduciary was limited to any investment 
advice it may have rendered. That regulation provides: 
          "The personal liability of a fiduciary who is 
          not a named fiduciary is generally limited to 
          the fiduciary functions which he or she 
          performs with respect to the plan."   
 
Janney cites Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132 (1982) in arguing that 
this regulation is entitled to substantial deference. See Brief 
of Janney at 20.  However, that is beside the point.  First, it 
is not as clear as Janney suggests that the alleged breach has no 
nexus to any duty it may owe. Lloyd was retained and entrusted 
with substantial assets belonging to the Funds. Although his 
integrity and honesty may not bear a direct relation  to the 
caliber of financial advice he gave, it is unrealistic to suggest 
that a broker's integrity is irrelevant to how he or she will 
dispose of assets of another that have been entrusted to that 
broker's care, custody and control.  Second, even assuming that 
Janney's position in this regard has merit, this case does not 
require us to choose between respect for an agency's expertise on 
the one hand, and affording de novo review on the other.  29 
C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (FR-16) does not establish a universal 
principle that allows for no exceptions. It merely states that 
exposure of an unnamed fiduciary is "generally" limited to the 
functions it performs. We must determine whether any liability of 
Janney should be so restricted under these circumstances.  We 
conclude that, although, exceptions to this general rule may 
often produce results that would be both unworkable and unfair, 
this is not such a case. 
     Section 404(a) of ERISA defines the duty that a fiduciary 
owes as follows:  
             a fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
          with respect to a plan in the interest of the 
          participants and beneficiaries and -- 
 
          (A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
 
          (I) providing benefits to participants and 
          their beneficiaries; and 
 
          (ii) defraying the reasonable expenses of 
          administering the plan; 
 
          (B) with the care, skill, prudence and 
          diligence under the circumstances then 
          prevailing that a prudent man acting in a 
          like capacity and familiar with such matters 
          would use in the conduct of an enterprise of 
          a like character and with like aims 
 
U.S.C. § 1104(a).  "Section 404(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1104] is the 
touchstone for understanding the scope and object of an ERISA 
fiduciary's duties."  Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters 
Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1994). In 
Bixler, we reiterated the following pronouncement of Justice 
Brennan  in Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 
U.S. 134, 153-53 (1985): "Congress intended in § 404(a) to 
incorporate the fiduciary standards of trust law into ERISA, and 
it is black-letter trust law that fiduciaries owe strict duties 
running directly to beneficiaries in the administration and 
payment of trust benefits."  Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1299.  Thus, 
section 404(a) "although articulat[ing] a number of fiduciary 
duties, is not exhaustive."  Id.    See also, Central States, 
Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Central Transport, 
Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985) ("Congress relied upon the common 
law of trusts to 'define the general scope of [trustees' and 
other fiduciaries'] authority and responsibility'"). 
     Under the common law of trusts, a fiduciary has a 
fundamental duty to furnish information to a beneficiary.  "This 
duty to inform is a constant thread in the relationship between 
beneficiary and trustee; it entails not only a negative duty not 
to misinform, but also an affirmative duty to inform when the 
trustee knows that silence might be harmful."  Bixler, at 1300.  
See also, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas and Electric Co., 121 
N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1918) ("A beneficiary, about to plunge into a 
ruinous course of dealing, may be betrayed by silence as well as 
by the spoken word.").  
    The Funds contend that the evidence shows that Janney knew 
that Lloyd's representation about his payment to the limited 
partnership was false, and that Janney strongly suspected that 
Lloyd had altered a negotiable instrument to cover his tracks.  
Although Janney now suggests that it had no proof of Lloyd's own 
wrong doing and surmised that he may have been covering up for a 
sister, the information Janney gave to the NASD clearly 
establishes that Lloyd's integrity was, at best, suspect. Yet, 
Janney sat silently by knowing that the Funds were placing their 
assets under Lloyd's control.  According to the Funds, Janney's 
reasons for doing so had nothing to do with a careful, prudent, 
or reasoned consideration of what was best for the Funds.  They 
point to the deposition of Rudolph Sander, a Janney executive, as 
instructive. When asked if he thought it "would have been 
important for the accounts to know that Mr. Lloyd was involved in 
this kind of conduct" he responded: 
                    If I have a suspicion that somebody did 
                    something wrong and he feels he didn't, and I 
                    tell [a] . . . customer that, in our opinion, 
                    we have a suspicion that this man has done 
                    something wrong and it impinges on his 
                    ability to make a living, I think he would 
                    have had a good, very good case against us. 
                    So which side of that would you like to be 
                    on? 
                     
          Appendix at 269a.  This, the Funds argue, shows that Janney 
withheld the information from the Funds that it gave to the NASD 
out of a fear of being sued, and a concern for its own well 
being.   
    Janney seeks to prevail on two theories.  First, Janney 
would have us hold that if it was a fiduciary, the Funds' failure 
to make a specific request for information about Lloyd somehow 
alleviated any obligation Janney would have otherwise had to 
disclose the very information the Funds needed in order to 
prudently conduct their affairs.  Such a result would not only 
hoist the beneficiary by its own petard, it is contrary to well 
established principles governing the relationship between a 
fiduciary and beneficiary.  The Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
provides: 
         [The trustee] is under a duty to communicate 
         to the beneficiary material facts affecting 
         the interest of the beneficiary which he 
         knows the beneficiary does not know and which 
         the beneficiary needs to know for his 
         protection in dealing with a third person. 
 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173, comment d. (1959).  
    We have never held that a request is a condition precedent 
to such a duty regardless of the circumstances known to the 
fiduciary.  To the contrary, it is clear that circumstances known 
to the fiduciary can give rise to this affirmative obligation 
even absent a request by the beneficiary.  "[T]he duty to 
disclose material information 'is the core of a fiduciary's 
responsibility.'" Bixler, 12 F.3d at 1300.  Indeed, absent such 
information, the beneficiary may have no reason to suspect that 
it should make inquiry into what may appear to be a routine 
matter.  If Janney was a fiduciary, the Funds' failure to request 
information concerning Lloyd's departure has no bearing on 
whether Janney breached the duties it owed the Funds by not 
volunteering the information. 
    Second, Janney argues that it never had sufficient 
information to determine what the Funds needed to know because it 
was not certain Lloyd had violated securities regulations or the 
law when he left Janney.  Since Lloyd's transgression pertained 
only to his personal business affairs, Janney maintains that it 
discharged him because he did not "'act in a very high standard'"  
Janney demands of its employees.  Brief of Janney at 8.  Janney 
insists that Lloyd's refusal to fully explain the circumstances 
of the late payment did not meet that standard.   Refined to its 
essence, Janney argues that there was no reason to tell the Funds 
about the circumstances surrounding Lloyd's departure or to 
believe that the Funds needed the information to protect itself 
in its dealings with Lloyd, because there was only unsupported 
suspicion of misconduct that did not appear to involve any 
clients' accounts.  
    Contrary to Janney's assertion, we believe that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact concerning the breach of fiduciary 
duties.  Janney gave the NASD a detailed narrative that supports 
an inference that Lloyd altered a check to make it appear that 
payment had been duly made.  Lloyd was sufficiently compromised 
that Janney intended to discharge him.  There is a dispute, 
however, concerning Janney's motivations and the materiality of 
the information not volunteered.  From Janney's characterization 
of Lloyd's departure, a finder of fact could conclude that there 
was no breach of any duty.  If, in contrast, the Funds' 
characterization of the events prevails, a finder of fact could 
properly conclude that Janney's conduct falls within the 
boundaries of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173, comment d 
set forth above.  Moreover, we believe that it might come under 
such a responsibility should come as no surprise to Janney.  Over 
80 years ago Judge Cardozo explained:  
 
         The trustee is free to stand aloof, while 
         others act, if all is equitable and fair. He 
         cannot rid himself of the duty to warn and 
         denounce, if there is improvidence or 
         oppression, either apparent on the surface, 
         or lurking beneath the surface, but visible 
         to his practiced eye.   
 Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. at 380. If 
Janney was a fiduciary, it could not turn its "practiced eye" to 
its self-interest, while turning a blind eye to the interests of 
its beneficiary.  
    We do not, of course, hold that one who may have attained a 
fiduciary status thereby has an obligation to disclose all 
details of its personnel decisions that may somehow impact upon 
the course of dealings with a beneficiary/client.  Rather, a 
fiduciary has a legal duty to disclose to the beneficiary only 
those material facts, known to the fiduciary but unknown to the 
beneficiary, which the beneficiary must know for its own 
protection.  The scope of that duty to disclose is governed by 
ERISA's Section 404(a), and is defined by what a reasonable 
fiduciary, exercising "care, skill, prudence and diligence," 
would believe to be in the best interest of the beneficiary to 
disclose.      
    Here, Janney provided information to the NASD which 
certainly called Lloyd's character and integrity into question.  
However, we do not dismiss the fact that the NASD, after being 
supplied with that information by Janney and after its own 
investigation, chose only to issue a relatively minor reprimand 
to Lloyd.  Thus, it is certainly conceivable that the Fund would 
have transferred assets to Lloyd even if Janney had made a 
disclosure to the Fund.  Nevertheless, we conclude that Janney's 
failure to disclose creates an issue of fact as to whether it 
acted with the exercise of "care, skill, prudence and diligence," 
required by Section 404(a), and if not, whether failure to do so 
caused Lloyd's subsequent loss. 
    In summary, we hold that, on remand, if the fact-finder 
determines that Janney was an ERISA fiduciary, then Janney, as an 
ERISA fiduciary, had a duty to disclose to the Funds any material 
information which it knew, and which the Funds did not know, but 
needed to know for its protection.  Whether the information 
contained in the NASD report is that kind of material information 
which Janney, in the exercise of "care, skill, prudence and 
diligence," was required by Section 404(a) to disclose is a 
factual question to be determined by the fact finder.   The well 
established obligations endemic in the law of trusts requires 
nothing less.  
 
              C.  The Duration of The Relationship.   Lloyd's departure 
from Janney before the Funds transferred 
its accounts to LSI will not relieve Janney of all obligations to 
the Funds if Janney was a fiduciary.  Assuming arguendo that 
Janney became an ERISA fiduciary on August 28, 1984, when the 
Funds' trustees named Lloyd their investment consultant, we 
believe ERISA fiduciary duty law, and the law of trusts it 
incorporates, would require that the duty to disclose material 
information continue beyond his departure.   If found to be a 
fiduciary, Janney cannot realistically argue that despite its 
prior fiduciary role, it can disavow all duties to ensure the 
sound management of the Funds' assets.  Nor does the fact that 
little investment activity occurred between the time of Lloyd's 
resignation and the transfer of the Funds' accounts to Provident 
detract from Janney's fiduciary status.  Fiduciary status, once 
established, is not dependent solely on the amount of investment 
activity. 
    While fiduciary relationships generally, and under ERISA in 
particular, are consensual in the sense that the parties must 
voluntarily enter a relationship having the stipulated 
characteristics, once a fiduciary relationship exists, the 
fiduciary duties arising from it do not necessarily terminate 
when a decision is made to dissolve that relationship.  Courts 
that have considered the issue have held that an ERISA 
fiduciary's obligations to a plan are extinguished only when 
adequate provision has been made for the continued prudent 
management of plan assets.  See Chambers v. Kaleidoscope, Inc., 
Profit Sharing Plan and Trust, 650 F. Supp. 359, 369 (N.D.Ga. 
1986); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Greene, 570 F. Supp. 
1483, 1488 (W.D.Pa. 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1100 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 
485 F. Supp. 629, 635 (W.D.Wis. 1979).  This obligation to ensure 
that fiduciary obligations will continue to be met is a component 
of the prudence imposed by Section 404(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) ("a fiduciary shall discharge his duties . 
. . with the care, skill, prudence and diligence . . . that a 
prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would employ).  Chambers, 650 F. Supp at 369; Greene, 570 
F. Supp. at 1497-98; Freund, 485 F. Supp at 635. 
    In this case, the fiduciary relationship existed, if at all, 
as the result of an agreement under which Janney undertook for a 
fee to provide advice on a regular basis to the Funds that would 
"serve as a primary basis for investment decisions with respect 
to plan assets" and to "render individualized investment advice 
to the plan regarding such matters as . . . investment policies 
or strategy, overall portfolio compositions, or diversity of plan 
investments."  The Funds came to have such a relationship with 
Janney only because of their faith in Lloyd.  When Lloyd left 
Janney, it became uncertain whether that relationship would 
continue and, shortly thereafter, the Funds ceased to utilize the 
services of Janney in the same way.  Accordingly, the fiduciary 
status of Janney under ERISA, which was predicated solely on that 
relationship, ceased.  Under the applicable principle of trust 
law, however, Janney's fiduciary duty to advise the Funds of 
information they needed for their own protection continued at 
least until someone (the Funds themselves or another investment 
advisor) undertook to exercise the function that Lloyd had 
performed as a Janney vice president.  Thus, at the point when 
Janney was advised of the Funds' intention of engaging Lloyd's 
new firm as a fiduciary, Janney retained a fiduciary duty to 
disclose to the Funds material information then in its possession 
concerning Lloyd's conduct.  
    Our holding that a duty to disclose material information may 
extend beyond Lloyd's departure finds support in the common law 
of trusts.  Under the traditional law of trusts, a trustee cannot 
relieve himself or herself of duties under the trust simply by 
conveying the trust assets to another willing to serve.  ii Austin 
Wakeman Scott & William Franklin Fratcher, the law of trusts § 106 (4th 
ed. 
1987).  A trustee's resignation is valid under three 
circumstances only, i.e., when the trustee resigns with 
permission of the appropriate court, with the consent of all the 
beneficiaries or in accordance with the terms of the trust. The 
Law of Trusts § 106.  Further, a resigning trustee is not relieved 
of liability for his or her management of the trust until he or 
she has accounted to a court for the trust's administration.  The 
Law of Trusts § 106.1; see also, e.g., Nixon's Estate, 83 A. 687 
(Pa. 1912) ("The general rule is that a trustee may relieve 
himself from liabilities arising from a trust relation by 
submitting the administration of the trust to the jurisdiction of 
the court.").   
    Although these common law rules help to guarantee the 
continued proper administration of the trust, they are not 
completely workable in the ERISA context.  For example, ERISA 
does not provide for a court accounting procedure for a resigning 
fiduciary.  Nonetheless, the purpose underlying those principles 
is relevant to our inquiry.  There are times when "the law of 
trusts. . will inform, but will not necessarily determine the 
outcome, of an effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties."  
Varity Corp. v. Howe,     U.S.    , 116 S.Ct. 1065, 1070 (1996).  
In such a case, the common law of trusts is the "starting point, 
after which courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, 
the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes 
require departing from common law trust requirements." Id.  
    ERISA "protects employee pensions and other benefits. . . by 
setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the 
management of both pension and nonpension benefits plans."  
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S.Ct. at 1070.  Therefore, when "we 
apply [ERISA's fiduciary duty section] to the facts of a 
particular case, we remain mindful of ERISA's underlying 
purposes."  In re UNISYS Savings Plan Litigation, 74 F.3d 420, 
434 (3d Cir. 1996).  The protection which ERISA is intended to 
afford private pension and benefit plans would be vitiated if an 
ERISA fiduciary was able to simply walk away from the plan under 
the circumstances presented to us here.  An ERISA fiduciary is 
defined "not in terms of formal trusteeship, but in functional 
terms of control and authority".  Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.,    U.S.    , 
113 S.Ct. 2063, 2071 (1993). 
    According to the Funds, the information Janney provided on 
the NASD form indicates that Lloyd improperly handled his own 
investments, fraudulently altered a commercial instrument and 
lied about his actions.  If Janney was a fiduciary, and if its 
conduct would otherwise be a breach of fiduciary duties, it may 
not hide behind Lloyd's departure to shield it from the 
consequences of its actions.  
     
                       IV. Common Law Duty 
    The Funds argue: "to the extent [they] do not have a 
statutory claim against Janney under ERISA, they do have such a 
claim either under federal common law or under state common law." 
See  Brief of the Funds at 39.  As noted earlier, the district 
court granted Janney's motion for summary judgment as to both 
theories.  Accordingly, we turn our attention to the Funds' 
claims for relief under federal and state common law. 
                      A. Federal Common Law 
    Congress has authorized federal courts to create common law 
in certain instances.  Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 
353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957). However (as the learned district 
court correctly noted) we do so only to further Congress' intent 
by filling gaps in specific legislation. 
                    Since Congress both authorized and expects 
                    that the courts will create a common law 
                    under ERISA, we need not look for a specific 
                    congressional intent to create the remedy at 
                    issue. Instead, the inquiry is whether the 
                    judicial creation of a right in this instance 
                    is 'necessary to fill in interstitially or 
                    otherwise effectuate the statutory pattern 
                    enacted in the large by Congress. . .' 
                     
          Plucinski v. I.A.M. National Pension Fund, 875 F.2d 1052, 1056 
(3d Cir. 1989).  We find no such interstices here.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the district court's grant of Janney's motion for 
summary judgment on Count II. 
                       B. State Common Law 
    Section 514(a) of ERISA pre-empts "any and all State laws 
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee 
benefit plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).  "A law 'relates to' an 
employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it 
has a connection with or reference to such a plan."  Shaw v. 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).  The district 
court held that the state common law claim was pre-empted by 
ERISA and therefore granted Janney's motion for summary judgment 
on that claim.  The district court premised its preemption 
holding on its belief that the state law claim involved the 
administration of the Funds' pension and benefits plans.  
Glaziers and Glassworkers Union Local 252 Annuity Fund, et al. v. 
Newbridge Securities, et al., 877 F. Supp. at 944-945 ("Indeed, 
this Court has held that a plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty 
claim relating to the administration of an employee benefit plan 
brought under state law is preempted by ERISA.  Accordingly, we 
must conclude that the Funds' [state law] breach of fiduciary 
duty claim is preempted by ERISA. . . .").    
    The Funds contend that the district court's preemption 
finding is dependent upon an initial finding that Janney was an 
ERISA fiduciary.  If, however, Janney is not ultimately found to 
be an ERISA fiduciary, the Funds argue that its state law claim 
does not "relate to" an employee benefit plan and that it is, 
therefore, not preempted.  In that case, the state law claim 
would simply be a "commonplace", "run-of-the-mill state law 
claim" which, although "affecting and involving" an ERISA plan is 
not pre-empted by ERISA.  See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency 
& Service, 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988).  In short, the Funds can 
continue to press its state law claim against Janney. 
    We believe there is merit to the Funds' preemption argument.  
Although there is no bright line between a claim which "affects 
or involves" an ERISA plan without, at the same time, "relating 
to" an ERISA plan, our opinion in United Wire, Metal and Machine 
Health and Welfare Fund, et al. v. Morristown Memorial Hospital, 
995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), does aptly describe how a state law 
relates to an ERISA Plan.  We wrote: 
         A rule of law relates to an ERISA plan if it 
         is specifically designed to affect employee 
         benefit plans, it if singles out such plans 
         for special treatment, or if the rights and 
         restrictions it creates are predicated on the 
         existence of such a plan. 
 
                     ************************** 
 
            This does not end our inquiry, however.  A 
         state rule of law may be preempted even 
         though it has no such direct nexus with ERISA 
         plans if its effect is to dictate or restrict 
         the choices of ERISA plans with regard to 
         their benefits, structure, reporting and 
         administration, or if allowing states to have 
         such rules would impair the ability of a plan 
         to function simultaneously in a number of 
         states. 
 
995 F.2d at 1192-1193.           
    If, on remand, the district court finds that Janney was not 
an ERISA fiduciary, the Funds' state law claim should be 
subjected to the analysis in United Wire.  It may very well be 
that even in the event that Janney is not an ERISA fiduciary, the 
state law claim may relate to an ERISA plan and be preempted.  
However, if Janney is not found to be an ERISA fiduciary, there 
is still room to argue that any fiduciary duty Janney may have 
had toward the Funds arises under state law and does not "relate 
to", but only "affects and involves" an ERISA plan.  That is, the 
state law claim may not relate to the administration of an 
employee benefit plan at all.  For example, the Funds may 
successfully argue that there is a fiduciary duty which arises 
between a client and a stockbroker and that the duty was breached 
by Janney's failure to disclose.   
    Thus, we cannot, at this juncture, either prevent the Funds 
from trying to show that its state law claim is not preempted or 
hold as a matter of law that the state law claim is preempted.  
Of course, it may be impossible for the Funds to demonstrate that 
their claim is not preempted (even if Janney is not an ERISA 
fiduciary); however, that finding should be made by the district 
court after it makes a finding on Janney's status as a fiduciary 
under ERISA.   
    Finally, if the district court finds that state law claim is 
not pre-empted, it will then have to determine if the claim is 
time-barred as Janney contends.  See Zimmer v. Gruntal & Co., 
Inc., 732 F.Supp. 1330, 1336 (W.D.Pa.1989) ("breach of fiduciary 
duty is tortious conduct and subject to two year statute of 
limitations period, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7)").   
 
                               VII. 
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Janney on Count II, the federal 
common law claim, and will reverse the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Janney on Count I, the ERISA claim, and on Count III, 
the state law claim, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                
 
GLAZIERS AND GLASS WORKERS UNION LOCAL 252,  
ET AL. v. NEWBRIDGE SECURITIES, INC.,  
Nos. 95-1175, 95-1215, 95-1283              
 
STAPLETON, J., Circuit Judge, Concurring: 
    I join the opinion of the court.  I write separately because 
I would resolve the issue of whether ERISA preempts a state law 
that would impose a fiduciary duty of disclosure on Janney under 
the circumstances of this case.  The district court properly 
addressed and resolved that legal issue, its resolution will not 
be affected by further development of the record, and, in the 
interest of conserving judicial resources, I would provide the 
district court with the benefit of our view on that issue. 
    Applying the principles that we reviewed in United Wire, I 
would hold that if Janney is not an ERISA fiduciary under § 
1002(21)(A), a state law imposing a fiduciary duty of disclosure 
on it would not be preempted by ERISA.  ERISA, by spelling out 
who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan and its participants, 
defines the area of federal concern in which preemption is 
required.  Beyond that area, I would hold that a state can 
continue, by a generally applicable law, to prescribe the duties, 
fiduciary or otherwise, owed to a plan by its broker, just the 
way it can continue, by a generally applicable law, to prescribe 
the duties owed to a plan by its accountant, its lawyer, a 
corporate director of a company it owns, or its plumber. 
